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Abstract 
We attempt to measure the effect of competition on bias in the context of analyst earnings 
forecasts, which are known to be excessively optimistic due to conflicts of interest.  Our 
instrument for competition is mergers of brokerage houses, which result in the firing of 
analysts because of redundancy (e.g., one of the two oil analysts is let go) and other 
reasons such as culture clash.  We use this decrease in analyst coverage for stocks 
covered by both merging houses before the merger (the treatment sample) to measure the 
causal effect of competition on bias. We find the treatment sample simultaneously 
experiences a decrease in analyst coverage and an increase in optimism bias the year after 
the merger relative to a control group of stocks, consistent with competition reducing 
bias. The implied economic effect from our natural experiment is significantly larger than 
estimates from OLS regressions that do not correct for the endogeneity of coverage.  And 
this effect is much more significant for stocks with little initial analyst coverage or 
competition. 
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I. Introduction 
Reporting bias is an important aspect of economic life.  A prominent example is 
the well-documented excessive optimism of sell-side analysts’ earnings forecasts and 
recommendations (Brown, Foster, and Noreen (1985), Stickel (1990), Abarbanell (1991), 
Dreman and Berry (1995), and Chopra (1998)).  In the aftermath of the collapse of 
internet stock valuations, Congress blamed the exuberance of well-known analysts, such 
as Mary Meeker and Jonathan Blodgett for contributing to the losses of individual 
investors who bought internet stocks on their recommendations (Kane (2001)).  Another 
prominent example as of late is media bias.  Some media outlets slant to the right on the 
political spectrum, while others slant to the left, e.g. Fox News reports on the same event 
with a more conservative slant than does the New York Times (e.g., Groseclose and Milo 
(2005)).  There is some concern that such bias is leading to polarization of the electorate 
and failing trust in the media.  Recently, the bias of credit rating agencies such as 
Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s has been blamed for the subprime crisis.  Numerous 
theories have been advanced on the nature of reporting bias in a variety of contexts (see 
Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006) for a review). 
An important question, both from an academic and a regulatory perspective, 
arising out of these concerns about bias is the extent to which competition affects bias.  
There are a number of views on this issue.  The one that we focus on, the competitive 
pressure view, is that competition reduces bias because of the pressure to be accurate.  
This view implicitly assumes that consumers (e.g., investors or readers of news) want 
accuracy.  Another perspective, or the catering view, is that competition need not reduce 
and may increase bias if consumers want to hear reports that conform to their priors. 
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Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) provide a recent model of bias that is emblematic of the 
first view, while Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) provide one for the second view.1 
In this paper, we attempt to shed light on the competitive pressure view by 
measuring the effect of competition on bias in the context of analyst earnings forecasts.  
Our paper takes as its point of departure a large literature that convincingly shows that 
analyst optimism bias arises out of conflicts of interest – a desire to be objective by 
producing accurate forecasts (desired by investors) versus the need to curry favor with 
companies and help their houses bring in investment banking business and sales and 
trading commissions through the issuance of positive forecasts and recommendations.2 
Several key findings from this literature shape our analysis.  First, a number of 
papers find that an analyst from a brokerage house that has an underwriting relationship 
with a stock tends to issue more positive predictions than analysts from nonaffiliated 
houses (see Dugar and Nathan (1995), Lin and McNichols (1998), Dechow, Hutton, and 
Sloan (1999), Michaely and Womack (1999)).  Sales and trading commissions are also 
important in generating optimism bias (Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy (2006)).  Second, 
many investors (retail) cannot adjust for this bias (i.e. de-bias) and these optimistic 
recommendations have an effect on stock prices (see Michaely and Womack (1999), 
Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007)).  Importantly, analysts’ career outcomes depend 
both on relative accuracy and optimism bias (see Hong and Kubik (2003), Fang and 
Yasuda (2006)). 
                                               
1
 Both also provide comprehensive overview of both of these views. 
2
 Companies naturally like analysts to be optimistic about their stocks, particularly when they are doing 
initial or seasoned equity offerings. They would not do business with an investment bank if the analyst 
were not positive about the stock. 
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We build on existing models of analyst bias to develop the competitive pressure 
view more formally in Appendix A.  Consistent with the empirical evidence, implicit in 
models of bias (and hence our model) is that many investors (e.g. retail) cannot easily de-
bias and also reward analysts based on relative accuracy (see Laster, Bennett, and Geoum 
(1999) and Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006) for discussions).  Since analysts are rewarded 
for relative accuracy by investors, under the competitive pressure view, we would expect 
more competition in the form of analysts covering a stock to lead to less bias.  If an 
analyst has no competition in forecasting a stock, he can easily weigh the rewards from 
bias while ignoring, at least in the short run, the need for accuracy.  However, other 
analysts through relative performance evaluation provide a check on the sanity or 
accuracy of an analyst’s forecasts.  Moreover, to the extent that collusion is not possible, 
greater competition even in the form of one analyst (who might turn out to be 
whistleblower) could significantly improve accuracy. 
The only complication in our setting is that since analysts are not rewarded solely 
for accuracy, it might be the case that competition may have no effect on bias and might 
even increase it to the extent that analysts might have to compete for investment banking 
business by being even more optimistic.  Hence, any causal effect from competition we 
identify in this setting is really the net of these conflicting interests.  So whether or not 
competition actually improves accuracy is empirical question of great interest. Note also 
that investors typically want accurate forecasts as opposed to having their priors 
confirmed.  So our setting is ideal to test the competitive pressure view but not 
necessarily the catering view. 
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Consistent with the competitive pressure view, existing evidence indicates that the 
average bias of earnings forecasts is significantly smaller for stocks with more analyst 
coverage and presumably competition (Lim (2001)).3  Using data on analyst forecasts 
from 1980 to 2005, we replicate this finding below by regressing the average forecast 
bias of a stock on analyst coverage and a number of other covariates including firm size.  
Henceforth, we will refer to the average or mean bias of a stock as simply the bias of that 
stock.  These regressions are based on a sample of large stocks in the top 25% of the 
market capitalization distribution.  We restrict ourselves to this sample to facilitate a 
comparison with the results from our natural experiment.  The mean analyst coverage of 
these stocks is about 21 analysts and the standard deviation across stocks is about 10 
analysts.  Depending on the controls used, we find that a decrease in one analyst leads to 
an increase in bias of anywhere from 0.0002 (2 basis points) to 0.0006 (6 basis points).  
The bias for a typical stock is about 0.03 (3 percent) with a standard deviation across 
stocks of about 0.03 (3 percent).  Hence, these estimates obtained from cross-section 
regressions suggest a modest increase in bias of about 60 basis points to 2 percent as a 
fraction of the cross-sectional standard deviation of bias as we decrease coverage by one 
analyst, though they are very precisely measured. 
Of course, these cross-sectional regressions are difficult to interpret due to the 
endogeneity of analyst coverage.  For instance, if stocks that attract lots of coverage are 
those analysts are likely to be excited about, then these OLS estimates are biased 
downward.  We would then expect to find a larger causal effect from competition if we 
could randomly allocate analysts to different stocks.  Alternatively, stocks that attract lots 
                                               
3
   Note that the focus of Lim (2001) is not on competition and bias.  Rather it is to show that bias can be 
rational because bias helps analysts get access to a firm and hence to provide more accurate forecasts.  
Analyst coverage ends up being one of his control variables.  In contrast, it is our main variable of interest. 
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of coverage may be stocks that every analyst has to cover and so any given analyst does 
not have to be optimistic about the prospects of the company to issue a forecast.  In 
contrast, stocks covered by only a few analysts are likely under-the-radar stocks that 
analysts have to be very excited about to initiate coverage on.  In this instance, the OLS 
estimate of the competition effect would be biased upwards.  Existing studies suggest that 
the first worry – a selection bias in coverage in that analysts tend not to cover stocks that 
they do not issue positive forecasts about – is more likely to be relevant in the data (e.g., 
McNichols and O’Brien (1997)). 
To more accurately identify the causal effect of competition or coverage on bias, 
we use mergers of brokerage houses as an instrument for competition.  When brokerage 
houses merge, they typically fire analysts because of redundancy and potentially lose 
additional analysts for other reasons including culture clash and merger turmoil (e.g., Wu 
and Zang (2007)).  For example, if the merging houses each had one analyst covering oil 
stocks, they would only keep one of the two oil stock analysts after the merger.  We use 
this decrease in analyst coverage for stocks covered by both merging houses before the 
merger (the treatment sample) to measure the causal effect of competition on bias.  
During the period of 1980 to 2005, there are fifteen mergers of brokerage houses that 
affected 948 stocks (stocks covered by both merging houses) or 1656 stock observations.  
We measure the change in analyst coverage and mean bias for the stocks in the treatment 
sample from one year before the merger to one year after relative to a control group of 
stocks.  The control group is stocks with the same market capitalization, market-to-book 
ratio, and past return features as the treatment sample.  The exclusion restriction is that 
the change in the mean bias of the treatment sample across the merger date is not due to 
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any factor other than the merger leading to a decrease in analyst coverage of those stocks.  
We think this is a good instrument since the merger-related departures of analysts due to 
redundancy or culture clash ought not to a priori be related to anything having to do with 
the bias of the forecasts of the other analysts, particularly those working for other houses. 
We first verify the premise of our instrument by measuring the change in analyst 
coverage for the treatment sample from the year before the merger to the year after.  We 
expect these stocks to experience a decrease in coverage since one of the redundant 
analysts is typically let go. The exact number depends on a couple of factors.  On the one 
hand, the fired analyst might get a job with another firm and cover the same stock, which 
means the decrease in coverage might be less than one.  On the other hand, a firm might 
lose or fire both analysts for reasons of culture clash or merger turmoil.  In this case, if 
neither analyst is rehired by another firm, we would see a decrease in coverage of two 
analysts.  It is an empirical question as to what the magnitude turns out to be.  We find 
that the average drop in coverage for the treatment sample (using the most conservative 
control group) is around 1 analyst with a t-statistic of around 5.3.  One can think of this 
finding as essentially the first stage of our instrumental-variables estimation.  The effect 
is economically and statistically significant in the direction predicted, and hence 
confirming the premise of our natural experiment. 
We then measure the change in the mean bias for the treatment sample across the 
merger date. We find that the treatment sample simultaneously experiences an increase in 
optimism bias the year after the merger relative to a control group of stocks.  A 
conservative estimate is that the mean optimism bias increases by 17 basis points (as a 
result of reducing coverage by 1 analyst).  As we mentioned earlier, the sample for the 
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natural experiment is similar to that of the OLS by construction – the typical stock has a 
bias of around 0.03 and the standard deviation of the optimism bias is also around 0.03.  
So, this means that the estimate of the competitive effect from our natural experiment is 
anywhere from three to eight times as large as the OLS estimates.  The results are similar 
when we use median estimates instead of mean estimates for bias in a stock and when we 
use an alternative regression approach rather than a pure difference-in-differences 
approach.  This is a sizeable difference and suggests that the OLS estimates are biased 
downwards, consistent with the documented selection bias that stocks that attract lots of 
coverage are likely to have more optimistic analysts. 
We then consider a number of robustness checks.  Primarily, we worry that our 
mean bias effect might be driven by selection due to which one of the two analysts from 
the merging firms covering the stock gets fired.  It might be that the less optimistic 
analyst gets fired and hence the bias might be higher as a result.  Another possibility 
could be that analysts employed by the merging houses may compete for the job in the 
new merged house and thus they may strategically change their reporting behavior. To 
deal with these issues, we only look at the change in the bias for the analysts covering the 
same stocks but not employed by the merging firms.  The findings are similar. 
In this paper, we focus on annual earnings forecasts since these are the key 
numbers that the market looks to and every analyst has to submit such a forecast.  For 
completeness, we also look at how long-term growth forecasts and stock 
recommendations change for the treatment sample in comparison to the control sample 
around these mergers.  One big downside is that data is more sparse as analysts do not 
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issue as many timely growth forecasts or recommendations.  Nonetheless, we find similar 
results, which is reassuring. 
We also test an auxiliary prediction that will further buttress our identification 
strategy.  We check to see whether the competition effect is more pronounced for stocks 
with smaller analyst coverage.  The idea is that the more analysts covering a stock, the 
less the loss of an additional analyst matters – akin to Cournot competition.  (There is a 
caveat if collusion is possible as we explain below.)  We divide initial coverage into three 
groups: less than or equal to five analysts, between 6 and 20 analysts, and greater than   
20 analysts.  We find that the effect is significantly smaller with greater initial coverage.  
This key result of our paper is very comforting as it reassures us that our instrumental-
variables estimation is a sensible one. 
Finally, we look at how forecast dispersion and mean forecast error change along 
with the increase in forecast bias.  Our competition effect has ambiguous implications for 
the directional change of these two quantities.  We find that both forecast dispersion and 
accuracy fall across the mergers. We interpret these findings in light of a number of 
different theories. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  We describe the data in Section II and replicate 
the OLS regressions of bias on analyst coverage in Section III.  In Section IV, we provide 
background and statistics on the mergers.  We discuss the methodology we use to 
measure the effect of the mergers on analyst coverage and bias in Section V and describe 
the results in Section VI.  We conclude in Section VII. 
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II. Data 
Our data on security analysts come from the Institutional Brokers Estimates 
System (IBES) database.  Our full sample covers the period 1980-2005.  In our study, we 
focus on annual earnings forecasts since these types of forecasts are the most commonly 
issued.  For each year, we take the most recent forecast of the annual earnings.  As a 
result, we have for each year one forecast issued by each analyst covering a stock. 
Our data on U.S. firms come from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) and COMPUSTAT.  From CRSP, we obtain monthly closing stock prices, 
monthly shares outstanding, daily and monthly stock returns for NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ stocks over the period of 1980-2005.  From COMPUSTAT, we obtain annual 
information on corporate earnings, book value of equity, and book value of assets during 
the same period.4  To be included in our sample, a firm must have the requisite financial 
data from both CRSP and COMPUSTAT.  We follow other studies in focusing on 
companies with CRSP share codes of 10 or 11. 
We use the following variables in our study.  Analyst forecast bias is the 
difference between her forecast and the actual EPS divided by the previous year’s stock 
price.  Given the fact that the values of EPS reported by IBES tend to suffer from data 
errors we follow the literature and use EPS from COMPUSTAT.  Since our analysis is 
conducted at the stock level we further aggregate forecast biases and consider the 
consensus bias expressed as a mean or median bias among all analysts covering a 
particular stock, which is denoted by BIASit.  This is our main dependent variable of 
interest. 
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 Our results are similar if we use IBES earnings numbers as opposed to those from COMPUSTAT. 
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We also utilize a number of other independent variables.  COVERAGEit is the 
number of analysts covering stock i in year t.  LNSIZEit is the natural logarithm of firm i’s 
market capitalization (price times shares outstanding) at the end of year t.  SIGMAit is the 
variance of daily (simple, raw) returns of stock i during year t.  RETANNit is the average 
monthly return on stock i in year t.  LNBMit is the natural logarithm of firm i’s book value 
divided by its market cap at the end of year t.  ROEit is firm i’s return on equity in year t.  
ROE is calculated as the ratio of earnings during year t over the book value of equity.  
Earnings are calculated as income before extraordinary items available to common 
stockholders (Item 237), plus deferred taxes from the income statement (Item 50), plus 
investment tax credit (Item 51).  To measure the volatility of ROE (VOLROEit), we 
estimate an AR(1) model for each stock’s ROE using the past 10-year series of the 
company’s valid annual ROEs.  We calculate VOLROEit as the variance of the residuals 
from this regression.  PROFITit is firm profitability, defined as operating income over 
book value of assets.  SPit is an indicator variable equal to one if the stock is included in 
S&P 500 index and zero otherwise. As in earlier studies, stocks that do not appear in 
IBES are assumed to have no analyst estimates. 
We also consider two additional dependent variables.  Our measure of analyst 
forecast error is defined as the absolute difference between her forecast and the actual 
EPS of firm i at time t.  Following Lim (2001), we exclude analyst forecasts whose 
absolute difference exceeds 10 dollars on the basis that this is likely a coding error.  We 
again express the differences as a percentage of the previous year’s stock price.  Like for 
forecast bias, we further aggregate forecast errors and consider the consensus error, 
expressed as a mean or median error among all analysts covering a particular stock, 
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which we denote by FERRORit.  FDISPit is forecast dispersion, defined as the standard 
deviation of all analyst forecasts covering firm i at time t.  Following Lim (2001) we 
exclude observations (stock-year) in which the stock price is less than 5 dollars or whose 
mean bias is at the outer tails – 2.5% left and right tails. 
III. OLS Results 
We begin by estimating a pooled OLS regression of the mean and median BIAS 
on lagged values of COVERAGE and a set of control variables as in Lim (2001).  As we 
alluded to in the Introduction, the focus of Lim (2001) is not on competition and bias.  
Rather it is to show that bias can be rational because bias helps analysts get access to a 
firm and hence to provide more accurate forecasts.  His cross-sectional regression 
emphasizes that analysts from small brokerage houses with limited access or analysts 
covering firms that have difficulty to predict earnings are those that are more likely to 
bias their forecasts.  Analyst coverage ends up being one of his control variables.  In 
contrast, it is our main variable of interest.  But we use the other independent variables in 
Lim’s cross-sectional specification as controls, which include LNSIZE, SIGMA, 
RETANN, LNBM, VOLROE, and PROFIT.  We additionally include S&P 500 index 
dummy (SP500) as well as potentially time and three-digit SIC industry fixed effects.  
Standard errors are clustered at the industry groupings. 
These regressions are based on a sample of large stocks in the top 25% of the 
market capitalization distribution.  We restrict ourselves to this sample to facilitate a 
comparison with the results from our natural experiment.5  The summary statistics for 
these regressions (time-series averages of cross-sectional means, medians, and standard 
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 Qualitatively, the same results hold even using the entire universe.  We have replicated these results, 
which are consistent with those in Lim (2001). 
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deviations) are reported in Table I.  The cross-sectional mean (median) analyst coverage 
of these stocks is about 21 (21) analysts and the standard deviation across stocks is about 
10 analysts.  The cross-sectional mean (median) bias is 0.027 (0.021) with a standard 
deviation of around 0.03. 
The regression results are presented in Table II.  We first present the results for 
the mean bias with just industry fixed effects in column (1) and with both industry and 
time fixed effects in column (2).  In column (1), the coefficient in front of COVERAGE is 
–0.0006 and is statistically significant at the 1% level of significance.  In column (2), the 
coefficient is smaller at –0.0002 but it is still statistically significant at the 5% level of 
significance.  So depending on the controls used, we find that a decrease in coverage by 
one analyst leads to an increase in bias of anywhere from 0.0002 (2 basis points) to 
0.0006 (6 basis points).  The bias for a typical stock is about 0.027 (2.7 percent) with a 
standard deviation across stocks of about 0.03 (3 percent).  Hence, these estimates 
obtained from cross-section regressions suggest only a small increase in bias of about 60 
basis points to 2 percent as a fraction of the cross-sectional standard deviation of bias as 
we decrease coverage by one analyst, though they are very precisely measured.  The 
results using the median bias instead of mean bias are reported in columns (3) and (4).  
Again, there is little difference in the coefficient on COVERAGE. 
The other control variables also come in significantly in these regressions.  Bias 
increases with firm size, firm book-to-market ratio, volatility of return on equity, and 
firms’ profits.  Bias is lower for firms with high returns and for S&P500 firms.  The sign 
on stock return volatility is ambiguous depending on whether time fixed effects are 
included.  These results are vastly consistent with those reported in Lim (2001), though 
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the magnitudes of the coefficients do not always match those from Lim.  This is in part 
because we use a longer time series of data and we follow slightly different sample 
selection criteria.  Nevertheless, we can largely conclude that our sample is representative 
in that its qualitative aspects do not differ much from those reported in other studies. 
Of course, as we explained in the Introduction, these cross-sectional regressions 
are difficult to interpret due to the endogeneity of analyst coverage.  If stocks that attract 
lots of coverage are stocks that analysts are likely to be excited about, then these OLS 
estimates are biased downward.  In contrast, if stocks covered by only a few analysts are 
likely under-the-radar stocks that analysts have to be very excited about to initiate 
coverage on, then these OLS estimates of the competition effect are biased upwards.  
Estimating this regression using stock fixed effects is not an adequate solution to the 
endogeneity critique since analyst coverage tends to be a fairly persistent variable and 
analysts drop coverage on stocks when the stock is no longer doing well (see McNichols 
and O’Brien (1997)).6 
Hence, we need an instrument for competition to sort out these endogeneity 
issues.  We will use mergers of brokerage houses as our instrument on the premise that 
mergers typically lead to a reduction in analyst coverage on the stocks that were covered 
by both the bidder and target firms pre merger.  If a stock is covered by both firms before 
the merger, they will get rid of at least one of the analysts, usually the target analyst.  It is 
to these instruments that we now turn. 
 
                                               
6
 Indeed, when we run the regression using stock fixed effects, we find that the coefficient in front of 
coverage is basically zero and statistically insignificant.  Since coverage is fairly persistent, it may be that a 
fixed-effects approach is not picking up the right variation in contrast to the cross-sectional approach.  In 
any event, the endogeneity problem applies unless one can find an instrument. 
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IV. Background on Mergers 
We begin by providing some background on these mergers.  We identify mergers 
among brokerage houses by relying on information from the SDC Mergers and 
Acquisition database.  We start with the sample of 32,600 mergers of financial 
institutions.  Next, we choose all the mergers where the target company belongs to the 
four-digit SIC code 6211 (“Investment Commodity Firms, Dealers, and Exchanges”).  
This screen reduces our sample to 696 mergers. Subsequently, we manually match all the 
mergers with IBES data.  This match identifies 43 mergers with both bidder and target 
being covered by IBES.  Finally, we select only those mergers where both merging 
houses analyze at least two same stocks – otherwise, there is little scope for our 
instrumental variables approach below.  With this constraint, our search produced 15 
mergers, which we break down to parties involved: bidder and target.  We provide further 
details about these mergers in Appendix B. 
Of the 15 mergers, six are particularly big in the sense that the merging houses 
tend to both be big firms and had coverage pre-merger on a large number of similar 
stocks.  The first of these big mergers is Merrill Lynch acquiring in 9/10/1984 a troubled 
Becker Paribas that was having problems with its own earlier merger to another firm.  
The second is Paine Webber acquiring Kidder Peabody on 12/31/1994.  Kidder was in 
trouble and had fired a good part of its workforce before the merger and in the aftermath 
of a major trading scandal involving its government bond trader, Joseph Jett.  Kidder’s 
owner, General Electric, wanted to sell the company and Paine Webber (a second tier 
brokerage house) wanted to buy a top-tier investment bank with a strong research 
department.  The third is Morgan Stanley acquiring Dean Witter Reynolds on 
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05/31/1997.  Morgan-Stanley was portrayed as wanting to get in on the more down-
market retail brokerage operations of Dean Witter.  The fourth is Smith Barney 
(Travelers) acquiring Salomon Brothers on 11/28/1997.  This is viewed as a synergy play 
led by Sandy Weill. 
The fifth and sixth mergers involved Swiss banks trying to geographically 
diversify their lines of business into the American market.  These mergers happened 
within a few months of each other. Credit Suisse First Boston acquired Donaldson Lufkin 
and Jenrette on 10/15/2000.  A few months later on 12/10/2000, UBS acquired Paine 
Webber.  These anecdotal descriptions of the motivations for these mergers provide 
comfort in the exclusion restriction of our proposed instrument, which is that these 
mergers provide a change in competition that is unrelated to some underlying 
unobservable of the biases in the stocks. 
In Table III, we provide a number of key statistics regarding all fifteen mergers.  
In Panel A, we summarize the names, dates, and the number of stocks covered by the 
bidder and target individually and the overlap in the coverage.  For instance, in the 
merger involving Paine Webber and Kidder Peabody, Paine Webber covered 659 stocks 
and Kidder covered 545 stocks.  There was a 234 stock overlap in terms of their 
coverage.  As a result, the merger can potentially lead to a decrease of around one analyst 
for a large number of stocks.  The size of our treatment sample, the number of firms 
covered by both merging houses, ranges from a low of 5 stocks in the merger involving 
Fahnestock and Josephthal Lyon and Ross to a high of 327 stocks in the Smith Barner 
and Salomon Brothers deal.  Notice that the big six mergers described above give us 
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much of the variation in terms of the number of treatment stocks. In total, we have a 
significant treatment sample with which to identify our effect. 
To better support the premise that mergers lead to less analyst coverage in the 
treatment sample via job turnover, we examine career outcomes of analysts employed by 
merging houses.  Panel B presents the results with the breakdown of career outcomes of 
analysts employed by both the bidder and target house.  A few observations can be noted.  
First, the big mergers affected a very significant number of analysts.  The largest of the 
mergers – between Credit Suisse First Boston and Donaldson Lufkin and Jenrette – 
concerned almost 200 analysts.  The smallest merger in terms of analysts affected is 
Davidson and Jensen with ten.  Given that in our sample the average brokerage house 
employs approximately 15 analysts, a number of our mergers constituted an important 
event in the analyst industry. 
Second, as expected, mergers generally reduce the number of analysts covering 
stocks. For example, both brokerage houses, Paine Webber and Kidder Peabody, 
involved in the first merger employed a total of 101 analysts prior to merger. After Paine 
Webber acquired Kidder Peabody the employment in the joint entity decreased to 57 
analysts.  Third, the majority of the employment reduction comes from the closure of the 
target house.  In particular, out of 51 analysts employed by Kidder only 9 of them were 
retained in the new company, 28 left to a different house, while 14 exited the sample, 
which we interpret as a firing decision. 
In Panel C, we more precisely confirm that for stocks covered by both houses pre-
merger, it is usually the analyst in the bidding house that remains while the target analyst 
is let go.  In the first column of Panel C, we report for the treatment sample, stocks 
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covered by both houses, the fraction of that that is covered by the bidder analyst after the 
merger.  In the second column, we report the fraction covered by the target analysts after 
the merger of the treatment sample.  In the Paine Webber and Kidder merger, for stocks 
covered pre-merger by both houses, it is the target analyst that is indeed the redundant 
one that gets fired – the corresponding figures are 73.7% for the bidder analysts and only 
15.8% for the target analyst.  Similarly big gaps exist for most of the mergers.  This gap 
is much smaller in the Davidson and Jensen merger, 50% for the bidder and 50% for the 
target.  Nonetheless, from Panel B, it still appears that there were fewer analysts working 
for the merged entity than for the sum of the analysts at the two houses beforehand. 
V. Empirical Design 
Our analysis of the effect of competition on analyst forecast bias utilizes a natural 
experiment involving brokerage house mergers.  The outcome of such process is the 
reduction in the number of analysts employed in the combined entity compared to the 
total number of analysts employed in bidder and target entities prior to merger.  As a 
result, the number of analysts covering a stock that was covered by both houses before 
the merger (our treatment sample) should drop as one of the redundant analysts is let go 
or reallocated to another stock (or maybe even both are let go) and thus the competition 
in the treatment sample decreases.  The questions then are whether there is a decrease in 
competition among analysts around merger events and whether this is associated with an 
economically significant effect on average consensus bias. 
Our empirical methodology requires that we specify a representative window 
around the merger events.  In choosing the proper estimation window we face a trade-off 
unlike most event studies that would have us focus on a very narrow window.  As is the 
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case with most event studies, choosing a window which is too long may incorporate 
information which is not really relevant for the event in consideration.  But in our case, 
choosing too short of a window means we may lose observations since analysts may not 
issue forecasts at the same date or with the same frequency.  We want to keep a long 
enough window to look at the change in the performance of all analysts before and after 
the merger. 
To this effect, we decided to use a two-year event window, with one year of data 
selected for each pre- and post-event period.  Most analysts will typically issue at least 
one forecast within a twelve-month window.  Given that in each of the two windows one 
analyst could issue more than one forecast we retain only the forecast which has the 
shortest possible time distance from the merger date.  In addition, since we are interested 
in the effect of merger on various analyst characteristics, we require that each stock be 
present in both windows around the merger.  As a result, for every stock we note only 
two observations – one in each window of the event. 
Having chosen this one-year before and one-year after the merger event, one then 
has to factor in the fact that coverage and the average stock bias may vary from one year 
to the next one.  In other words, to identify how the merger affected coverage in the 
stocks covered by both houses pre-merger and how the bias in these stocks then also 
changed, one needs to account for the fact that there may be natural changes from year to 
year in coverage and bias for these stocks. 
A standard approach to deal with these time trends is based on the difference-in-
differences (DID) methodology.  In this approach, the sample of stocks is divided into 
treatment and control groups.  In the context of our paper, the treatment group includes 
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all stocks that were covered by both brokerage houses before the merger.  The control 
group includes all the remaining stocks.  If we denote the average observed 
characteristics in the treatment (T) and control (C) group in the pre- and post-event period 
by CT,1, CT,2, CC ,1, and CC,2, respectively, the partial effect to change due to merger can 
be estimated as: 
          DID = (CT,2  – CT,1) – (CC,2 – CC,1)                                      (1) 
Here the characteristics might be analyst coverage or bias.  By comparing the time 
changes in the means for the treatment and control groups we allow for both group-
specific and time-specific effects.  This estimator is unbiased under the condition that the 
merger is not systematically related to other factors that affect C. 
A potential concern with the above estimator is the possibility that the treatment 
and control groups may be significantly different from each other and thus the partial 
effect may additionally capture the differences in characteristics of the different groups. 
For example, the average stocks in both groups may differ in terms of their market 
capitalization or value characteristics. To account for such systematic differences across 
two samples we use the matching technique similar to that used in the context of IPO 
event studies or characteristic-based asset pricing. In particular, each stock in the 
treatment sample is matched with its own benchmark portfolio obtained using the sample 
of stocks in the control group. 
We use three different benchmarks. These benchmarks are motivated by the 
existing literature on the determinants of analyst coverage and bias.  For instance, it is 
well known from Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) that bigger stocks, higher priced stocks, 
and stocks with good past return attract more coverage.  Indeed, Lim (2001) then finds 
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that these three characteristics are also important for explaining bias as well, as we 
showed in Table II.  We expect our progressively tighter controls to typically do a better 
job at capturing our true effect by netting out unobserved heterogeneity. 
To construct the first benchmark, we sort stocks into tercile portfolios according 
to their market capitalization. The second benchmark is constructed by sorting stocks into 
tercile portfolios first according to their market capitalization and subsequently within 
each size portfolio sorting stocks again according to their book-to-market ratio. This sort 
results in 9 different benchmark portfolios.  Finally, the third benchmark further sorts 
stocks in each of the 9 portfolios into tercile portfolios according to their past returns, 
which in turn results in 27 different benchmark portfolios. 
For each of the three benchmark specifications, we then construct the benchmark-
adjusted DID estimators (BDID). In particular, for each stock i in the treatment sample 
the partial effect to change due to merger is calculated as the difference between two 
components: 
                                  BDIDi = (CiT,2 – CiT,1) – (BCiC,2 –BCiC,1),                                        (2) 
where the first component is the difference in characteristics of stock i in the treatment 
sample moving from the pre-merger to post-merger period. The second component is the 
difference in the average characteristics of the benchmark portfolios that are matched to 
stock i along the size, size/value, and size/value/momentum dimensions. To assess the 
average effect for all stocks in the treatment sample, one can then take the average of all 
individual BDIDs. 
An alternative approach to capture the effect to change in the bias due to merger 
that we consider is to estimate the following regression model: 
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          Ci = α + β1Mergei + β2Affectedi + β3Mergei×Affectedi + β4Controlsi + εi                   (3) 
where C is the characteristic which may be subject to merger; Merge is an indicator 
variable, equal to one for observations after the merger, and zero, otherwise; Affected is 
an indicator variable equal to one if stock i was affected by the merger, and zero, 
otherwise; Controls is a vector of stock-specific covariates affecting C. In this 
specification, the coefficient of primary interest is β3, which captures the partial effect to 
change due to merger; in the version with additional controls its value is similar in spirit 
to the DID estimator in equation (2).  By including additional controls we account for any 
systematic differences in stocks, which may affect the partial effect to change due to 
merger. 
One final issue which we need to account for is that a few of the mergers occurred 
within several months of each other (e.g., the fifth and sixth mergers occurred on 
10/15/2000 and 12/10/2000, respectively).  As a result, it might be difficult to separate 
out the effects of these two mergers individually.  As the baseline case, we decided for 
simplicity to treat each merger separately in our analysis.  However, we have also played 
with robustness checks in which we group mergers occurring close together in time and 
treat them as one merger.  For instance, we consider a one-year window before the third 
merger on 10/15/2000 as the pre-merger period and the one-year window after the fourth 
merger on 12/10/2000 as the post-merger period.  As a result, the treatment sample is the 
union of 307 stocks jointly covered by Credit Suisse and DLJ and the 213 stocks covered 
by UBS and Paine Webber.  There is potentially some overlap of these two subsets of 
stocks and hence it might be the case that some of these stocks will experience a greater 
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decline in analyst coverage to the extent that they have more than two redundant analysts.  
However, these alterations do not affect our baseline results. 
Table IV presents summary statistics for the treatment sample in the two-year 
window around the merger.  The characteristics of the treatment sample are similar to 
those reported in Table I for the OLS sample.  For instance, the coverage is about 21 
analysts for the typical stock.  The mean bias is 2.79% with a standard deviation of 
around 3.10%.  These figures, along with those of the control variables, are fairly similar 
across these two samples.  This provides comfort that we can then relate the economic 
effect of competition obtained from our treatment sample to the OLS estimates presented 
in Table II. 
VI. Results 
A. Analyst Coverage and Optimism Bias 
We first verify the premise of our instrument by measuring the change in analyst 
coverage for the treatment sample from the year before the merger to the year after.  We 
expect these stocks to experience a decrease in coverage. 
Table V reports the results of this analysis.  We present the DID estimator for 
coverage using three different benchmarking techniques – size-matched, size and book-
to-market matched, and size, book-to-market, and return matched.  Using the size-
matched technique, we find an average drop in coverage for the treatment sample of 
around 1.14 analysts.  This effect is significant at the 1% level of significance.  The 
corresponding number for size and book-to-market match is 1.1 analysts, which is also 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  Finally, using the tight matching by size, book-
to-market, and past return characteristics, we find a drop in coverage of 1 analyst, which 
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is again very significant.  We observe a discernible drop in coverage due to merger using 
the DID estimator and the level of the drop of between one and two analysts is in line 
with our expectations. 
One can think of this finding as essentially the first stage of our instrumental 
variables estimation. The effect is economically and statistically significant in the 
direction predicted, and hence confirming the premise of our natural experiment.  We 
tend to believe the last number, 1 analyst, since it arises from the most conservative 
benchmarking technique and we will focus on this number in our discussion of the 
economic effect of competition below. 
We next look at how the optimism bias changes for the treatment sample across 
the mergers.  These results are presented in Table VI.  We present the findings in the first 
column for the mean BIAS and in the second column for the median BIAS.  Using the 
DID estimator with size matching, we find an increase in optimism bias of 0.0019 for the 
mean bias (significant at the 5% level) and 0.0022 for the median bias (significant at the 
1% level).  The size and book-to-market matching technique yields slightly smaller 
estimates of 0.0017 for the mean bias and 0.0020 for the median bias.  The mean and 
median bias estimates are both statistically significant at the 5% level.  Finally, using the 
tighter size, book-to-market, and return match, we find corresponding figures of 0.0017 
and 0.0020 for the mean and median bias respectively.  These point estimates are not so 
different from those using only size and book-to-market matches.  The statistical 
significances are also similar. 
The results for the effect on bias using an alternative regression approach outlined 
in equation (3) are presented in Table VII.  The first column shows the result using mean 
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bias and the second column show the results for the median bias.  The regressions include 
the usual controls along with merger fixed effects and industry fixed effects.  We 
estimate our regression model using a pooled (panel) regression and calculating standard 
errors by clustering at the merger level.  This approach addresses the concern that the 
errors, conditional on the independent variables, are correlated within merger groupings 
(e.g., Moulton (1986)).  One reason why this may occur is that the bias occurring in one 
company may also naturally arise in another company covered by the same house 
because the broker tends to cover stocks with similar bias pressures.7 
In the first column, the coefficient of interest in front of MERGE×AFFECTED is 
0.0021, which is significant at the 10% level.  The coefficient of interest increases 
slightly to 0.0022 for median bias and the statistical significance level is 10%.  Hence, the 
results in this table are consistent with those using the DID estimator though the estimates 
are a bit bigger.  Note that the coefficient in front of MERGE is 0.0004 and the one in 
front of AFFECTED is -0.0007 (both for both mean and median bias).  Both are 
statistically insignificant.  This suggests that our treatment sample has very similar bias 
properties as the control sample and that our natural experiment is a good one.  In other 
words, the bias of the treatment sample really does increase relative to the control sample. 
Using the range of the estimates obtained above, a conservative estimate is that 
the mean optimism bias increases by 17 basis points (as a result of reducing coverage by 
1 analyst).  As we mentioned earlier, the sample for the natural experiment is similar to 
that of the OLS by construction – the typical stock has a bias of around 2.7% and the 
standard deviation of the optimism bias is also around 3%.  So, this means that the 
                                               
7
 We have also considered other dimensions of clustering: clustering by industry, by stock, by time, and by 
time and industry. All of them produced standard errors that were lower than the ones we report. 
 25 
estimate of the competitive effect from our natural experiment is anywhere from three 
times as large to eight times as large as the OLS estimates.  This is a sizeable difference 
and suggests that the OLS estimates are biased downwards, consistent with the 
documented selection bias that stocks that attract lots of coverage are likely to have more 
optimistic analysts. 
B. Robustness Checks 
We conduct a number of robustness checks.  The first is to separately estimate our 
effect using the six biggest mergers.  The results are very similar in that the conservative 
estimates are a 1 analyst drop in coverage associated with a 0.0017 increase in bias.  
Second, we estimate our effect separately for each of the fifteen mergers.  Each of the 
fifteen mergers experienced a decline in coverage using the most conservative DID 
estimate.  Hence, our result is not driven by outliers – there is a distinct coverage drop 
with mergers.  Clearly, the fact that fifteen out of fifteen mergers experienced a drop 
suggests that our effect is robustly significant in a non-parametric sense.  Similarly, we 
find that twelve (thirteen) of the fifteen mergers experienced an increase in mean 
(median) bias using the most conservative DID estimate.  It is important to emphasize 
that since these mergers occur throughout our entire sample our effects are not due to any 
particular macro-economic event such as a recession or boom. 
Third, we worry that our mean bias effect might be driven by selection due to 
which one of the two analysts from the merging firms covering the stock gets fired.  It 
might be that the less optimistic analyst gets fired and hence the bias might be higher as a 
result.  Another possibility could be that analysts employed by the merging houses may 
compete for the job in the new merged house and thus they may strategically change their 
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reporting behavior.  We deal with these issues in two ways.  The first is simply to check 
whether the merging brokerage houses selectively fire analysts who are less optimistic 
since we have turnover data.  We did not find such a selection bias.  The second and more 
direct way to deal with this is that we only look at the change in the bias for the analysts 
covering the same stocks but not employed by the merging firms.  The findings are in 
Table VIII.  We report the change in bias for the treatment sample but now the bias is 
calculated using only the forecasts of the analysts not employed by the merging houses.  
The figures are very similar to the main findings – only slightly smaller in some instances 
by a negligible amount.  Collectively, these findings provide comfort that our main 
results are not spuriously driven by some outliers or by selection biases. 
Finally, we worry that the bias change we are capturing may result from the 
difference in the timeliness of the forecasts issued pre-merger compared to post-merger. 
In particular, empirical evidence suggests that analyst bias is more pronounced the farther 
out is the forecast.  Indeed, there is a tendency for an analyst to under-shoot the earnings 
number for forecasts issued near the earnings date.  We checked that there was no 
difference in the timeliness of the forecasts issued pre-merger as compared to post-
merger.  We omit these results for brevity. 
C. Key Auxiliary Prediction 
We next test a key auxiliary prediction that will further buttress our identification 
strategy.  We check to see whether the competition effect is more pronounced for stocks 
with smaller analyst coverage.  The idea is that the more analysts cover a stock, the less 
the loss of an additional analyst matters (i.e. akin to the Cournot view of competition).  If 
collusion is possible, then we might expect a non-linear relationship between bias and 
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coverage.  Suppose that collusion is easier when there are only a few analysts.  Under this 
scenario going from one to two analysts may not have an effect because the two can 
collude.  And we might find more of an effect when going from five to six analysts if the 
sixth analyst does not collude.  With collusion, it might be that we expect the biggest 
effect for stocks covered by a moderate number of analysts – i.e., an inverted u-shape 
with the effect being the biggest for medium coverage stocks. 
We examine this issue in Table IX using the same DID framework as before with 
the matching done along the size, book-to-market, and return dimensions.  We divide 
initial coverage into three groups: less than or equal to five analysts, between 6 and 20 
analysts, and greater than 20 analysts.  The first column reports the results using mean 
bias.  We expect and find that the effect is significantly smaller when there are a lot of 
analysts covering. The effect is greatest for the first group (less than 6 analysts), followed 
by the second group (between 6 and 20), and the effect is much smaller for the biggest 
group.   The evidence is similar when we use median bias, as presented in the second 
column.  In sum, the evidence in Table IX is remarkably comforting as it conforms well 
to our priors on competition being more important when there are fewer analysts around.  
This result reassures us that our instrumental-variables estimation is a sensible one. 
D. Change in Long-Term Growth Forecasts and Recommendations 
In this paper, we focus on annual earnings forecasts since these are the key 
numbers that the market looks to and every analyst has to submit such a forecast.  For 
completeness, we also look at how long-term growth forecasts and stock 
recommendations change for the treatment sample in comparison to the control sample 
around these mergers.  One downside is that data in this case is more sparse as analysts 
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do not issue as many timely growth forecasts or recommendations.  Moreover, we cannot 
measure bias in the same way since there are no actual earnings forecasts to make the 
comparison to.  However, we can gauge the extent to which the average long-term 
forecast or recommendation changes for our treatment sample (provided data is available) 
across the merger date compared to the control group.  To the extent that there is less 
competition as a result of these mergers, we expect forecasts for percentage growth to be 
higher after the merger and for there to have more positive recommendations. 
The results for the long-term growth forecasts and recommendations are in Table 
X.  Panel A reports the results for long-term growth forecasts (which is the percentage 
long-term growth in earnings).  Using the most conservative benchmark, we see that 
long-term growth forecasts increase by 56 bps after the merger using mean forecasts and 
41 bps using median forecasts.  The mean long-term growth forecast in the treatment 
sample is 14% with a standard deviation of 6%.  So, a one-analyst drop in coverage in 
our treatment sample results in an increase in the mean long-term growth forecast that is 
about nine percent of a standard deviation of these forecasts.  This is both an 
economically and statistically significant effect. 
Panel B reports the results using recommendations. Recommendations are given 
in terms of the following five rankings: strong sell, sell, hold, buy, and strong buy.  We 
convert these into a score of 1 for strong sell, 2 for sell, 3 for hold, 4 for buy, and 5 for 
strong buy.  We then take the average and median of these recommendation scores and 
look at how they vary for the treatment sample and the control group across the merger 
date.  Using again the most conservative benchmark, the merger event is associated with 
an increase in the average recommendation score for the treatment sample of 0.05 using 
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the mean score and 0.09 using the median score.  The result using the mean score is not 
statistically significant, but the result using the median score is statistically significant at 
the 10% level.  However, both estimates imply quite significant economic effects.  The 
mean score for the treatment sample is 3.87 with a standard deviation of 0.44.  Hence, we 
find that a one analyst drop in coverage leads to about a 20% (10%) increase in the 
median (mean) recommendation score as a fraction of the standard deviation of these 
recommendations.  In sum, we conclude from this table that our baseline results using 
annual forecasts are robust to different measures of bias. 
E. Change in Forecast Dispersion and Forecast Error 
Finally, we look at how the forecast dispersion and mean forecast error change 
along with the increase in forecast bias.  Our competition effect in theory has ambiguous 
implications for the directional change in forecast dispersion and error.  On one hand, one 
might expect forecast dispersion to increase as the mean bias increases since there is 
more leeway for analysts to issue whatever forecast they want.  On the other hand, it 
might be that with less competition, all analysts will issue similarly optimistic forecasts 
without any checks on what they say.  Moreover, there are other theories of competition 
in analyst forecasts that would predict a strategic reason for why analyst dispersion might 
decrease with less competition.  For instance, Laster, Bennett, and Geoum (1999) and 
Ottaviani and Sorensen (2005) propose a model in which forecasters in a rank-order 
contest based on accuracy differentiate themselves in their forecasts strategically a la 
Hotelling in equilibrium, and so less competition may lead to less differentiation or 
dispersion. 
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We find that forecast dispersion falls across the mergers, consistent with the latter 
theories that predict that dispersion increases with competition.  The results are presented 
in Table XI.  Panel A presents the DID estimators.  For each of the benchmarks, there is a 
discernible drop in dispersion.  For the size, book-to-market, and return matched 
benchmark, the DID estimate is –0.0006 and it is significant at the 10% level of 
significance.  The cross-sectional standard deviation of FDISP is around 0.94, so this is a 
drop of about 6% relative to the cross-sectional standard deviation.  Panel B presents the 
results using the regression method.  The coefficient in front of MERGE×AFFECTED is 
0.0001 but is not statistically significant.  So these findings suggest that as there is less 
competition, analysts seem to be issuing similarly optimistic forecasts without any 
checks.  But the results are less robust compared to the bias findings since the regression 
results are not statistically significant.  In sum, our findings are consistent with a number 
of theories that predict that dispersion increases with competition.  In particular, it might 
be tantalizing evidence of strategic behavior to differentiate with more competition in the 
face of rewards for relative accuracy.  This is not an unreasonable perspective and 
completely consistent with our bias results.  However, it is difficult to differentiate 
among all these competing stories for the effect of competition on dispersion. 
The effect of competition on forecast accuracy is also ambiguous in theory.  On 
one hand, we naturally expect the mean forecast error to increase to the extent that the 
remaining analysts are now more biased.  On the other hand, there is heterogeneity in 
analyst forecasts (i.e., dispersion), with some analysts being persistently negative or 
pessimistically biased and some being optimistically biased.  In this paper, we do not deal 
with the why there is this heterogeneity.  This dispersion might come from strategic 
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reasons outlined above.  Or it might come from analysts using different models (see 
Hong, Stein, and Yu (2007)).  If dispersion is decreasing with less competition as found 
above, this may naturally lead to an association of improved accuracy.  In other words, 
there are two offsetting effects of competition on accuracy: (1) less competition means 
less accuracy since analysts can be as optimistic as they want; (2) less competition means 
less forecast dispersion and hence more accuracy. 
The results are presented in Table XII.  It turns out that forecast accuracy does 
indeed deteriorate. The economic and statistical significance, however, is sensitive to the 
estimation procedure.  In Panel A, we present the DID estimators for the change in both 
the mean and median forecast accuracy.  For each of our benchmarks, we see a decrease 
in forecast accuracy, with the effect typically larger and more significant for medians 
than for means.  For instance, using the DID estimator with size, book-to-market, and 
return benchmarking, there is an increase of about 0.0007 for the median forecast 
accuracy.  Since the cross-sectional standard deviation of forecast accuracy is 0.03, this is 
a decrease of about 2 percent.  These estimates are statistically insignificant.  In Panel B, 
we present the results using the regression approach.  Here, the coefficient in front of 
MERGE×AFFECTED for mean forecast error is 0.0023 (significant at the 5% level) and 
the coefficient for median forecast error is 0.0021 (significant at the 10% level). 
VII. Conclusion 
We attempt to measure the effect of competition on bias in the context of analyst 
earnings forecasts, which are known to be excessively optimistic due to conflicts of 
interest.  Using cross-sectional regressions, the existing literature finds that stocks with 
more analyst coverage, and presumably competition, have less biased forecasts on 
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average.  However, these OLS estimates are biased since analyst coverage is endogenous.  
We propose an instrument for competition – namely, mergers of brokerage houses, which 
result in the firing of analysts because of redundancy and other reasons including culture 
clash or general merger turmoil.  We use this decrease in analyst coverage for stocks 
covered by both merging houses before the merger (the treatment sample) to measure the 
causal effect of competition on bias.  We find the treatment sample simultaneously 
experiences a decrease in analyst coverage and an increase in optimism bias the year after 
the merger relative to a control group of stocks.  Our findings suggest that competition 
reduces analyst optimism bias.  Moreover, the economic effect from our IV estimates is 
larger than that from the OLS estimates by a factor of several times. 
Our instrument for analyst coverage can also be useful in other settings.  Namely, 
it can be used to identify the effect of analyst coverage on stock prices.  There is a large 
literature in finance and accounting that have tried to pin down whether analyst coverage 
increases stock prices and the mechanisms through which this might happen.  These 
studies are typically biased because of endogeneity as analysts tend to cover high priced, 
high performing, or large stocks for a variety of reasons.  In other words, the causality 
might be reversed.  Our instrument can hence be used to identify the causal effect of 
coverage on stock prices.  Recent interesting research in the spirit of our instrument is 
Kelly and Ljungqvist (2007) who uses closures of brokerage houses as a source of 
exogenous variation in coverage.  We anticipate more exciting work will be done along 
this vein. 
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Appendix A 
 
We consider a static set-up in which an analyst trades off the rewards for accuracy versus 
bias.  The empirical motivation for the model below comes from the large literature on 
conflicts of interest cited in the introduction.  Implicit in models of bias (and hence our 
model) is that many investors (e.g. retail) cannot easily de-bias and also reward analysts 
based on relative accuracy.  In particular, Hong and Kubik (2003) find that analysts’ 
incentives (at least through job separations) depend both on accuracy and also optimism 
bias.  Analysts’ career outcomes depend equally on both factors.  These findings also 
accord well with voluminous anecdotes on the incentives of sell-side analysts in the press 
also cited in the introduction. 
 
To model this conflict of interest, we assume that an analyst’s wage is equal to 
 
22 )ˆ)(()ˆ)(( Bxnxxnww −−−−= βα     (A.1) 
 
where 
 
w  is her fixed wage, )(nα  is the weight of accuracy in determining her wage (which as 
we discuss below will depend on the number of analysts), xˆ  is her forecast, x is the 
earnings, )(nβ is the weight of bias in determining her wage, and B is an exogenously  
given target that the analyst has an incentive to hit. 
 
For simplicity, we assume that the earnings x is normally distributed with mean zero and 
precision 0τ .  We further assume that the analyst receives a signal ε+= xs , where ε  is 
normally distributed with mean zero and precision τ .  And finally, we assume that the 
target BsxEB += ]|[ , where ]|[ sxE  is the analyst’s conditional expectation of earnings 
given his signal, and B is a positive constant. 
 
The analyst maximizes her expected wage given her signal s , which is equivalent to her 
minimizing with respect to xˆ  
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It is easy to rewrite this maximization problem as b  
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where ]|[ˆ sxExb −=  is the conditional bias.  The solution is given by 
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Notice that if 0)( =nβ  (only accuracy matters and not bias) then 0=b .  Alternatively, if 
0)( =nα  (only bias matters and not accuracy), then Bb = . 
 
As we explained in the introduction, one perspective on competition is that an analyst has 
to weigh accuracy more because of relative performance evaluation.  For instance, 
imagine that there is no competition.  Then, the analyst doesn’t have to worry about 
accuracy since she is the only game in town.  An extra analyst who provides an 
independent forecast will force her to weigh accuracy more to the extent that investors 
punish an analyst who is too far off from the consensus.  Now, analysts could collude on 
issuing optimistic forecasts.  So, to the extent that competition makes it more difficult for 
analysts to collude and issue optimistic forecasts, then we expect competition to make 
forecasts less upward biased.  These scenarios correspond to 0)(' >nα  and 0)(' =nβ .  
However, competition could have the other effect which is to make analysts issue more 
upwardly biased forecasts to the extent that it is needed to get customers or access to the 
firm, i.e. 0)(' >nβ .  As such, our empirical estimates are capturing the net of these 
competing effects. 
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Table I 
Summary Statistics on the IBES Sample 
We consider a sample of stocks covered by IBES during the period 1980-2005 with valid annual earnings forecast 
records. COVERAGEit is a measure of analyst coverage, defined as the number of analysts covering firm i at the end 
of year t.  Analyst forecast bias (BIASjt) is the difference between the forecast analyst j in year t and the actual EPS, 
expressed as a percentage of the previous year’s stock price. The consensus bias is expressed as a mean or median 
bias among all analysts covering a particular stock. Analyst forecast error (FERRORjt) is the absolute difference 
between the forecast analyst j in year t and the actual EPS, expressed as a percentage of the previous year’s stock 
price. The forecast error is expressed as a mean or median bias among all analysts covering a particular stock. 
FDISPit is analyst forecast dispersion, defined as the standard deviation of all analyst forecasts covering firm i in 
year t. LNSIZEit is the natural logarithm of firm i’s market capitalization (price times shares outstanding) at the end 
of year t.  SIGMAit is the variance of daily (simple, raw) returns of stock i in year t. RETANNit is the average 
monthly return on stock i in year t. LNBMit is the natural logarithm of firm i’s book value divided by its market cap 
at the end of year t. To measure the volatility of ROE (VOLROE), we estimate an AR(1) model for each stock’s ROE 
using a 10-year series of the company’s valid annual ROEs.  ROEit is firm i’s return on equity in year t.  ROE is 
calculated as the ratio of earnings in year t over the book value of equity. We calculate VOLROE as the variance of 
the residuals from this regression.  PROFITit is the profitability of company i at the end of year t, defined as 
operating income over book value of assets. We exclude observations that fall to the left of the 25th percentile of the 
size distribution, observations with stock prices lower than $5, and those for which the absolute difference between 
forecast value and the true earnings exceeds $10. 
 
Variable Cross-sectional mean Cross-sectional median Cross-sectional st. dev. 
COVERAGEi,t 21.45 21 9.57 
Mean BIASi,t (in %) 2.70 2.10 3.10 
Median BIASi,t (in %) 2.64 2.01 3.17 
Mean FERRORi,t (in %) 3.31 2.39 2.93 
Median FERRORi,t (in %) 3.24 2.26 3.00 
FDISPi,t (in %) 0.75 0.41 1.02 
LNSIZEi,t 8.38 8.38 1.62 
SIGMAi,t (in %) 40.72 35.04 21.03 
RETANNi,t (in %) 1.73 1.49 4.04 
LNBMi,t -1.02 -0.92 0.88 
VOLROEi,t (in %) 26.53 10.43 19.79 
PROFITi,t (in %) 15.48 15.29 9.38 
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Table II 
Regression of Consensus Forecast Bias on Company Characteristics 
The dependent variable is BIAS, defined as a consensus forecast bias of all analysts tracking stock i in year 
t. Forecast bias is the difference between the forecast of analyst j in year t and the actual EPS, expressed as 
a percentage of the previous year’s stock price. The consensus is obtained either as a mean or median bias. 
COVERAGEi,t is a measure of analyst coverage, defined as the number of analysts covering firm i at the 
end of year t.  LNSIZEi,t is the natural logarithm of firm i’s market capitalization (price times shares 
outstanding) at the end of year t.  SIGMAit is the variance of daily (simple, raw) returns of stock i during 
year t. RETANNi,t is the average monthly return on stock i in year t. LNBMi,t is the natural logarithm of firm 
i’s book value divided by its market cap at the end of year t. To measure the volatility of ROE (VOLROE), 
we estimate an AR(1) model for each stock’s ROE using a 10-year series of the company’s valid annual 
ROEs.  ROEi,t is firm i’s return on equity in year t.  ROE is calculated as the ratio of earnings in year t over 
the book value of equity. VOLROE is the variance of the residuals from this regression. PROFITi,t is the 
profitability of company i at the end of year t, defined as operating income over book value of assets. 
SP500i,t is an indicator variable equal to one if stock i is included in the S&P500 index in year t. We 
exclude all observations that fall to the left of the 25th percentile of the size distribution, observations with 
stock prices lower than $5, and those for which the absolute difference between forecast value and the true 
earnings exceeds $10. All regressions include three-digit SIC industry fixed effects. Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are clustered at the industry level. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance. 
 
Variables\Model Mean BIAS Median BIAS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
COVERAGEi,t-1 -0.0006*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0002** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0006*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0002*** 
(0.0001) 
LNSIZEi,t-1 0.0065*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0028*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0065*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0028*** 
(0.0008) 
SIGMAi,t-1 0.0098** 
(0.0047) 
-0.0095 
(0.0061) 
0.0091* 
(0.0047) 
-0.0097 
(0.0060) 
RETANNi,t-1 -0.0852*** 
(0.0169) 
-0.1001*** 
(0.0199) 
-0.0827*** 
(0.0162) 
-0.0988*** 
(0.0193) 
LNBMi,t-1 0.0124*** 
(0.0016) 
0.0121*** 
(0.0016) 
0.0121*** 
(0.0016) 
0.0118*** 
(0.0016) 
VOLROEi,t-1 0.0058*** 
(0.0020) 
0.0062*** 
(0.0019) 
0.0057*** 
(0.0019) 
0.0060*** 
(0.0019) 
PROFITi,t-1 0.0544*** 
(0.0100) 
0.0577*** 
(0.0095) 
0.0541*** 
(0.0103) 
0.0576*** 
(0.0098) 
SP500i,t-1 -0.0116*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.0111*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0116*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.0110*** 
(0.0025) 
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9313 9313 9313 9313 
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Table III 
Descriptive Statistics for Mergers 
Panel A includes the names of brokerage houses involved in mergers, the date of the merger, and the number of stocks covered by either 
brokerage house or both of them prior to the merger.  Panel B breaks down the merger information at the analyst level. We include 
number of analysts employed in the merging brokerage houses prior to merger and after the merger as well as the detailed information 
on the career outcomes of the analysts after the merger.  Panel C calculates the percentage of analysts from the merging houses that 
cover the same stock after the merger. We restrict our sample of stocks to those which were covered by bother the bidder and the target 
house. 
Panel A: Mergers Used in the Analysis and Stocks Covered 
 
Merger 
number 
Merger Date # Stocks 
(Bidder) 
# Stocks 
(Target) 
# Stocks (Bidder 
and Target) 
Merrill Lynch 1 9/10/1984 762  173 
Becker Paribas 
  
 288  
Paine Webber 2 12/31/1994 659  234 
Kidder Peabody    545  
Morgan Stanley 3 05/31/1997 739  251 
Dean Witter Reynolds    470  
Smith Barney (Travelers) 4 11/28/1997 914  327 
Salomon Brothers    721  
Credit Suisse First Boston 5 10/15/2000 856  307 
Donaldson Lufkin and Jenrette    595  
UBS Warburg Dillon Read 6 12/10/2000 596  213 
Paine Webber    487  
Chase Manhattan 7 12/31/2000 487  80 
JP Morgan    415  
Wheat First Securities 8 10/31/1988 178  8 
Butcher & Co 
  
 66  
EVEREN Capital 9 1/9/1998 178  17 
Principal Financial Securities    142  
DA Davidson & Co 10 2/17/1998 76  8 
Jensen Securities    53  
Dain Rauscher 11 4/6/1998 360  26 
Wessels Arnold & Henderson    135  
First Union 12 10/1/1999 274  21 
EVEREN Capital    204  
Paine Webber 13 6/12/2000 516  28 
JC Bradford    182  
Fahnestock 14 9/18/2001 117  5 
Josephthal Lyon & Ross    91  
Janney Montgomery Scott 15 3/22/2005 116  10 
Parker/Hunter    54  
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Panel B: Career Outcomes of Analysts after Mergers 
Broker  # Analysts # Analysts After Merger 
 Merger 
Number 
Prior After Retained 
in the 
House 
Left to 
Another 
House 
Exited 
Sample 
(Fired) 
New 
Analysts 
Merrill Lynch 1 90 98 84 0 5 13 
Becker Paribas  27 - 1 11 15 - 
Paine Webber 2 50 57 42 1 7 6 
Kidder Peabody  51 - 9 28 14 - 
Morgan Stanley 3 70 92 61 2 7 26 
Dean Witter Reynolds  35 - 5 16 14 - 
Smith Barney (Travelers) 4 91 140 70 6 15 27 
Salomon Brothers  76 - 43 20 13 - 
Credit Suisse First Boston 5 120 146 93 5 22 35 
Donaldson Lufkin Jenrette  77 - 18 17 42 - 
UBS Warburg Dillon Read 6 94 118 80 5 9 0 
Paine Webber  64 - 38 8 17 - 
Chase Manhattan 7 64 106 48 5 11 24 
JP Morgan  50 - 34 1 15 - 
Wheat First Securities 8 13 21 13 0 0 8 
Butcher & Co Inc  13 - 3 3 7 - 
EVEREN Capital 9 27 31 21 4 2 8 
Principal Financial Securities  18 - 2 6 10 - 
DA Davidson & Co 10 6 8 4 1 1 0 
Jensen Securities  4 - 4 0 0 - 
Dain Rauscher 11 39 36 19 9 11 6 
Wessels Arnold & Henderson  15 - 11 0 4 - 
First Union 12 35 54 26 2 7 16 
EVEREN Capital  32 - 12 0 20 - 
Paine Webber 13 54 55 37 9 8 18 
JC Bradford  22 - 0 0 22 - 
Fahnestock 14 14 16 7 1 6 9 
Josephthal Lyon & Ross  14 - 0 0 14 - 
Janney Montgomery Scott 15 13 15 11 1 1 3 
Parker/Hunter  5 - 1 0 4 - 
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Panel C: Percentage of Stocks Covered by Analysts from Bidder and Target Houses after Mergers 
Merger Percentage of Stocks (Bidder) Percentage of Stocks (Target) 
(1) 85.7 1.1 
(2) 73.7 15.8 
(3) 66.3 5.4 
(4) 50.0 30.7 
(5) 63.7 12.3 
(6) 67.8 32.3 
(7) 45.3 32.1 
(8) 61.9 14.3 
(9) 67.7 6.5 
(10) 50.0 50.0 
(11) 52.8 30.6 
(12) 48.1 22.2 
(13) 67.3 0 
(14) 43.8 0 
(15) 73.3 6.7 
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Table IV 
Summary Statistics for the Treatment Sample 
We consider all stocks covered by two merging brokerage houses around the one-year merger event 
window. COVERAGEit is a measure of analyst coverage, defined as the number of analysts covering firm i 
at the end of year t.  Analyst forecast bias (BIASjt) is the difference between the forecast analyst j at time t 
and the actual EPS, expressed as a percentage of the previous year’s stock price. The consensus bias is 
expressed as a mean or median bias among all analysts covering a particular stock. Analyst forecast error 
(FERRORjt) is the absolute difference between the forecast analyst j at time t and the actual EPS, expressed 
as a percentage of the previous year’s stock price. The forecast error is expressed as a mean or median bias 
among all analysts covering a particular stock. FDISPit is analyst forecast dispersion, defined as the 
standard deviation of all analyst forecasts covering firm i at time t. LNSIZEit is the natural logarithm of firm 
i’s market capitalization (price times shares outstanding) at the end of year t.  SIGMAit is the variance of 
daily (simple, raw) returns of stock i during year t. RETANNit is the average monthly return on stock i 
during year t. LNBMit is the natural logarithm of firm i’s book value divided by its market cap at the end of 
year t. To measure the volatility of ROE (VOLROE), we estimate an AR(1) model for each stock’s ROE 
using a 10-year series of the company’s valid annual ROEs.  ROEit is firm i’s return on equity in year t.  
ROE is calculated as the ratio of earnings during year t over the book value of equity. We calculate 
VOLROE as the variance of the residuals from this regression.  PROFITit is the profitability of company i at 
the end of year t, defined as operating income over book value of assets. We exclude observations with 
stock prices lower than $5 and those for which the absolute difference between forecast value and the true 
earnings exceeds $10. 
 
Variable Cross-sectional mean Cross-sectional median Cross-sectional st. dev. 
COVERAGEi,t 21.12 20 9.45 
Mean BIASi,t (in %) 2.79 2.24 3.10 
Median BIASi,t (in %) 2.74 2.21 3.19 
Mean FERRORi,t (in %) 3.40 2.52 2.90 
Median FERRORi,t (in %) 3.33 2.43 2.99 
FDISPi,t (in %) 0.75 0.40 0.94 
LNSIZEi,t 8.39 8.37 1.60 
SIGMAi,t (in %) 41.00 35.86 21.02 
RETANNi,t (in %) 1.74 1.52 4.13 
LNBMi,t -1.03 -0.92 0.91 
VOLROEi,t (in %) 25.32 9.89 43.40 
PROFITi,t (in %) 15.52 15.25 9.22 
  
 43 
Table V 
Change in Stock-Level Coverage: DID Estimator 
We measure analyst coverage as the number of analysts covering firm i at the end of year t. For all mergers, 
we split the sample of stocks into those covered by both merging brokerage houses (treatment sample) and 
those not covered by both houses (control sample). We also divide stocks into pre-merger period and post-
merger period (one-year window for each period). For each period we further construct benchmark 
portfolios using the control sample based on stocks’ size (SIZE), book-to-market ratio (BM), and average 
past year’s returns (RET). Our benchmark assignment involves three portfolios in each category. Each 
stock in the treatment sample is then assigned to its own benchmark portfolio (SIZE-matched, SIZE/BM-
matched, and SIZE/BM/RET-matched). Next, for each period, we calculate the cross-sectional average of 
the differences in analyst stock coverage across all stocks in the treatment sample and their respective 
benchmarks. Finally, we calculate the difference in differences between post-event period and pre-event 
period (DID Estimator).  Our sample excludes observations with stock prices lower than $5 and those for 
which the absolute difference between forecast value and the true earnings exceeds $10. Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are clustered at the merger groupings. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical 
significance. 
 
DID Estimator (SIZE-Matched) -1.144*** 
(0.218) 
DID Estimator (SIZE/BM-Matched) -1.096*** 
(0.187) 
DID Estimator (SIZE/BM/RET-Matched) -1.034*** 
(0.188) 
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Table VI 
Change in Forecast Bias: DID Estimator 
We measure analyst forecast bias (BIASjt) as the difference between the forecast analyst j at time t and the actual 
EPS, expressed as a percentage of the previous year’s stock price. The consensus bias is expressed as a mean or 
median bias among all analysts covering a particular stock. For all mergers, we split the sample of stocks into 
those covered by both merging brokerage houses (treatment sample) and those not covered by both houses 
(control sample). We also divide stocks into pre-merger period and post-merger period (one-year window for 
each period). For each period we further construct benchmark portfolios using the control sample based on 
stocks’ size (SIZE), book-to-market ratio (BM), and average past year’s returns (RET). Our benchmark 
assignment involves three portfolios in each category. Each stock in the treatment sample is then assigned to its 
own benchmark portfolio (SIZE-matched, SIZE/BM-matched, and SIZE/BM/RET-matched). Next, for each 
period, we calculate the cross-sectional average of the differences in analyst forecast bias across all stocks in the 
treatment sample and their respective benchmarks. Finally, we calculate the difference in differences between 
post-event period and pre-event period (DID Estimator). Our sample excludes observations with stock prices 
lower than $5 and those for which the absolute difference between forecast value and the true earnings exceeds 
$10. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the merger groupings. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 5%, and 
10% statistical significance. 
 
 Mean BIAS Median BIAS 
DID Estimator (SIZE-Matched) 0.0019** 
(0.0007) 
0.0022*** 
(0.0007) 
DID Estimator (SIZE/BM-Matched) 0.0017** 
(0.0007) 
0.0020** 
(0.0007) 
DID Estimator (SIZE/BM/RET-Matched) 0.0017** 
(0.0007) 
0.0020** 
(0.0007) 
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Table VII 
Change in Forecast Bias: Regression Evidence 
The dependent variable is forecast bias (BIAS), defined as the difference between forecasted earnings and 
actual earnings, adjusted for the past year’s stock price. For each merger, we consider a one-year window 
prior to merger (pre-event window) and a one-year window after the merger (post-event window). We 
construct an indicator variable (MERGE) equal to one for the post-event period and zero for the pre-event 
period. For each merger window, we assign an indicator variable (AFFECTED) equal to one for each stock 
covered by both merging brokerage houses (treatment sample) and zero otherwise. LNSIZE is a natural 
logarithm of the market cap of the stock; SIGMAit is the variance of daily (simple, raw) returns of stock i 
during year t; RETANN is annual return on the stock; LNBM is a natural logarithm of the book to market 
ratio; COVERAGE denotes the number of analysts tracking the stock. To measure the volatility of ROE 
(VOLROE), we estimate an AR(1) model for each stock’s ROE using a 10-year series of the company’s 
valid annual ROEs.  ROEit is firm i’s return on equity in year t.  ROE is calculated as the ratio of earnings in 
year t over the book value of equity. VOLROE is the variance of the residuals from this regression. 
PROFITit is the profitability of company i at the end of year t, defined as operating income over book value 
of assets. SP500 is an indicator variable equal to one if a stock is included in the S&P500 index. We also 
include three-digit SIC industry fixed effects and merger fixed effects. We include results based on both 
mean and median bias. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the merger groupings. ***, **, * 
denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance. 
 
 Mean BIAS Median BIAS 
MERGEi 0.0004 0.0004 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) 
AFFECTEDi -0.0007 -0.0007 
 (0.0015) (0.0014) 
MERGEi*AFFECTEDi 0.0021* 0.0022* 
 (0.0011) (0.0012) 
LNSIZEi,t-1 0.0007 0.0008* 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) 
SIGMAi,t-1 -0.0048* -0.0050** 
 (0.0024) (0.0022) 
RETANNi,t-1 0.0115 0.0184** 
 (0.0076) (0.0073) 
LNBMi,t-1 0.0110*** 0.0109*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) 
COVERAGEi,t-1 -0.0001** -0.0002*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
VOLROEi,t-1 0.0045*** 0.0045*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) 
PROFITi,t-1 0.0870*** 0.0865*** 
 (0.0039) (0.0041) 
SP500i,t-1 -0.0092*** -0.0090*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0021) 
Merger Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 57,100 57,100 
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Table VIII 
Change in Forecast Bias: DID Estimator (w/o analysts from merging houses) 
We exclude from our sample all analysts employed in the merging houses. We measure analyst forecast bias 
(BIASjt) as the difference between the forecast analyst j at time t and the actual EPS, expressed as a 
percentage of the previous year’s stock price. The consensus bias is expressed as a mean or median bias 
among all analysts covering a particular stock. For all mergers, we split the sample of stocks into those 
covered by both merging brokerage houses (treatment sample) and those not covered by both houses (control 
sample). We also divide stocks into pre-merger period and post-merger period (one-year window for each 
period). For each period we further construct benchmark portfolios using the control sample based on stocks’ 
size (SIZE), book-to-market ratio (BM), and average past year’s returns (RET). Our benchmark assignment 
involves three portfolios in each category. Each stock in the treatment sample is then assigned to its own 
benchmark portfolio (SIZE-matched, SIZE/BM-matched, and SIZE/BM/RET-matched). Next, for each period, 
we calculate the cross-sectional average of the differences in analyst forecast bias across all stocks in the 
treatment sample and their respective benchmarks. Finally, we calculate the difference in differences between 
post-event period and pre-event period (DID Estimator). Our sample excludes observations with stock prices 
lower than $5 and those for which the absolute difference between forecast value and the true earnings 
exceeds $10. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the merger groupings. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 
5%, and 10% statistical significance. 
 
 Mean BIAS Median BIAS 
DID Estimator (SIZE-Matched) 0.0017*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0020*** 
(0.0006) 
DID Estimator (SIZE/BM-Matched) 0.0015** 
(0.0006) 
0.0017** 
(0.0006) 
DID Estimator (SIZE/BM/RET-Matched) 0.0015** 
(0.0006) 
0.0017** 
(0.0007) 
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Table IX 
Change in Forecast Bias: Conditioning on Initial Coverage 
The table below presents our results by cuts on initial coverage.  There are three groups: lowest coverage (<=5), 
medium coverage (>5 and <=20) and highest coverage (>20).  We measure analyst forecast bias (BIASjt) as the 
difference between the forecast analyst j at time t and the actual EPS, expressed as a percentage of the previous 
year’s stock price. The consensus bias is expressed as a mean or median bias among all analysts covering a 
particular stock. For all mergers, we split the sample of stocks into those covered by both merging brokerage 
houses (treatment sample) and those not covered by both houses (control sample). We also divide stocks into 
pre-merger period and post-merger period (one-year window for each period). For each period we further 
construct benchmark portfolios using the control sample based on stocks’ size (SIZE), book-to-market ratio 
(BM), and average past year’s returns (RET). Our benchmark assignment involves three portfolios in each 
category. Each stock in the treatment sample is then assigned to its own benchmark portfolio (SIZE-matched, 
SIZE/BM-matched, and SIZE/BM/RET-matched). Next, for each period, we calculate the cross-sectional average 
of the differences in analyst forecast bias across all stocks in the treatment sample and their respective 
benchmarks. Finally, we calculate the difference in differences between post-event period and pre-event period 
(DID Estimator). Our sample excludes observations with stock prices lower than $5 and those for which the 
absolute difference between forecast value and the true earnings exceeds $10. Standard errors (in parentheses) 
are clustered at the merger groupings. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance. 
 
 Mean BIAS Median BIAS 
DID Estimator (SIZE/BM/RET-Matched) 
(Coverage <=5) 
0.0059* 
(0.0033) 
0.0076* 
(0.0043) 
DID Estimator (SIZE/BM/RET-Matched) 
(Coverage>5 & <=20) 
0.0020* 
(0.0010) 
0.0022** 
(0.0011) 
DID Estimator (SIZE/BM/RET-Matched) 
(Coverage>20) 
0.0012 
(0.0014) 
0.0014 
(0.0014) 
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Table X 
Change in Alternative Forecast Bias Measures: DID Estimator 
We measure analyst forecast bias (BIASjt) using two different measures: the forecast of long-term growth of 
analyst j at time t (Panel A), and the analyst’s j stock recommendation at time t (Panel B). For each analyst, 
the recommendation variable is ranked from 1 to 5, where 1 is strong sell, 2 is sell, 3 is hold, 4 is buy, and 5 
is strong buy. The consensus bias is expressed as a mean or median bias among all analysts covering a 
particular stock. For all mergers, we split the sample of stocks into those covered by both merging 
brokerage houses (treatment sample) and those not covered by both houses (control sample). We also 
divide stocks into pre-merger period and post-merger period (one-year window for each period). For each 
period we further construct benchmark portfolios using the control sample based on stocks’ size (SIZE), 
book-to-market ratio (BM), and average past year’s returns (RET). Our benchmark assignment involves 
three portfolios in each category. Each stock in the treatment sample is then assigned to its own benchmark 
portfolio (SIZE-matched, SIZE/BM-matched, and SIZE/BM/RET-matched). Next, for each period, we 
calculate the cross-sectional average of the differences in analyst forecast bias across all stocks in the 
treatment sample and their respective benchmarks. Finally, we calculate the difference in differences 
between post-event period and pre-event period (DID Estimator). Our sample excludes observations with 
stock prices lower than $5 and those for which the absolute difference between forecast value and the true 
earnings exceeds $10. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the merger groupings. ***, **, * 
denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance. 
 
Panel A: Long-Term Growth 
 Mean BIAS Median BIAS 
DID Estimator (SIZE-Matched) 1.019*** 
(0.228) 
0.835*** 
(0.235) 
DID Estimator (SIZE/BM-Matched) 0.866*** 
(0.238) 
0.663*** 
(0.245) 
DID Estimator (SIZE/BM/RET-Matched) 0.561** 
(0.224) 
0.406* 
(0.232) 
 
Panel B: Analyst Recommendations 
 Mean BIAS Median BIAS 
DID Estimator (SIZE-Matched) 0.0785* 
(0.0414) 
0.1216** 
(0.0576) 
DID Estimator (SIZE/BM-Matched) 0.0756* 
(0.0411) 
0.1195** 
(0.0562) 
DID Estimator (SIZE/BM/RET-Matched) 0.0512 
(0.0409) 
0.0917* 
(0.0562) 
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Table XI 
Change in Forecast Dispersion 
We measure analyst forecast dispersion (FDISPjt) as the standard deviation of all analyst forecasts covering 
firm i at time t. In Panel A, for all mergers, we split the sample of stocks into those covered by both merging 
brokerage houses (treatment sample) and those not covered by both houses (control sample). We also divide 
stocks into pre-merger period and post-merger period (one-year window for each period). For each period we 
further construct benchmark portfolios using the control sample based on stocks’ size (SIZE), book-to-market 
ratio (BM), and average past year’s returns (RET). Our benchmark assignment involves three portfolios in 
each category. Each stock in the treatment sample is then assigned to its own benchmark portfolio (SIZE-
matched, SIZE/BM-matched, and SIZE/BM/RET-matched). Next, for each period, we calculate the cross-
sectional average of the differences in forecast dispersion across all stocks in the treatment sample and their 
respective benchmarks. Finally, we calculate the difference in differences between post-event period and pre-
event period (DID Estimator). In Panel B, the dependent variable is FDISP. For each merger, we consider a 
one-year window prior to merger (pre-event window) and a one-year window after the merger (post-event 
window). We construct an indicator variable (MERGE) equal to one for the post-event period and zero for the 
pre-event period. For each merger window, we assign an indicator variable (AFFECTED) equal to one for 
each stock covered by both merging brokerage houses (treatment sample) and zero otherwise. LNSIZE is a 
natural logarithm of the market cap of the stock; SIGMAit is the variance of daily (simple, raw) returns of 
stock i during year t; RETANN is annual return on the stock; LNBM is a natural logarithm of the book to 
market ratio. To measure the volatility of ROE (VOLROE), we estimate an AR(1) model for each stock’s 
ROE using a 10-year series of the company’s valid annual ROEs.  ROEit is firm i’s return on equity in year t.  
ROE is calculated as the ratio of earnings in year t over the book value of equity. VOLROE is the variance of 
the residuals from this regression. PROFITit is the profitability of company i at the end of year t, defined as 
operating income over book value of assets. SP500 is an indicator variable equal to one if a stock is included 
in the S&P500 index. We also include three-digit SIC industry fixed effects and merger fixed effects. We 
include results based on both mean and median forecast error. Our sample excludes observations with stock 
prices lower than $5 and those for which the absolute difference between forecast value and the true earnings 
exceeds $10. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the merger groupings. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 
5%, and 10% statistical significance. 
 
Panel A: DID 
 FDISP 
DID Estimator              
(SIZE-Matched) 
-0.0008* 
(0.0004) 
DID Estimator          
(SIZE/BM-Matched) 
-0.0007** 
(0.0003) 
DID Estimator          
(SIZE/BM/RET-Matched) 
-0.0006* 
(0.0003) 
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Panel B:  Regression Evidence 
 FDISP 
MERGEi -0.0001 
(0.0001) 
AFFECTEDi -0.0001 
(0.0003) 
MERGEi*AFFECTEDi 0.0001 
(0.0005) 
LNSIZEi,t-1 0.0008*** 
(0.0001) 
SIGMAi,t-1 0.0048*** 
(0.0003) 
RETANNi,t-1 
 
-0.0156*** 
(0.0012) 
LNBMi,t-1 
 
0.0020*** 
(0.0001) 
VOLROEi,t-1 0.0024*** 
(0.0001) 
PROFITi,t-1 -0.0092*** 
(0.0005) 
SP500i,t-1 -0.0023*** 
(0.0002) 
Merger Fixed Effects Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
Observations 57,100 
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Table XII 
Change in Forecast Error 
We measure analyst forecast error (FERRORjt) as the absolute difference between the forecast analyst j at 
time t and the actual EPS, expressed as a percentage of the previous year’s stock price. The consensus error is 
expressed as a mean or median forecast error among all analysts covering a particular stock. In Panel A, for 
all mergers, we split the sample of stocks into those covered by both merging brokerage houses (treatment 
sample) and those not covered by both houses (control sample). We also divide stocks into pre-merger period 
and post-merger period (one-year window for each period). For each period we further construct benchmark 
portfolios using the control sample based on stocks’ size (SIZE), book-to-market ratio (BM), and average past 
year’s returns (RET). Our benchmark assignment involves three portfolios in each category. Each stock in the 
treatment sample is then assigned to its own benchmark portfolio (SIZE-matched, SIZE/BM-matched, and 
SIZE/BM/RET-matched). Next, for each period, we calculate the cross-sectional average of the differences in 
analyst forecast error across all stocks in the treatment sample and their respective benchmarks. Finally, we 
calculate the difference in differences between post-event period and pre-event period (DID Estimator). In 
Panel B, the dependent variable is FERROR. For each merger, we consider a one-year window prior to 
merger (pre-event window) and a one-year window after the merger (post-event window). We construct an 
indicator variable (MERGE) equal to one for the post-event period and zero for the pre-event period. For each 
merger window, we assign an indicator variable (AFFECTED) equal to one for each stock covered by both 
merging brokerage houses (treatment sample) and zero otherwise. LNSIZE is a natural logarithm of the 
market cap of the stock; SIGMAit is the variance of daily (simple, raw) returns of stock i during year t; 
RETANN is annual return on the stock; LNBM is a natural logarithm of the book to market ratio; COVERAGE 
denotes the number of analysts tracking the stock. To measure the volatility of ROE (VOLROE), we estimate 
an AR(1) model for each stock’s ROE using a 10-year series of the company’s valid annual ROEs.  ROEit is 
firm i’s return on equity in year t.  ROE is calculated as the ratio of earnings in year t over the book value of 
equity. VOLROE is the variance of the residuals from this regression. PROFITit is the profitability of 
company i at the end of year t, defined as operating income over book value of assets. SP500 is an indicator 
variable equal to one if a stock is included in the S&P500 index. We also include three-digit SIC industry 
fixed effects and merger fixed effects. We include results based on both mean and median forecast error. Our 
sample excludes observations with stock prices lower than $5 and those for which the absolute difference 
between forecast value and the true earnings exceeds $10. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the 
merger groupings. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance. 
 
Panel A: DID 
 Mean FERROR Median FERROR 
DID Estimator (SIZE-Matched) 0.0008 
(0.0005) 
0.0009** 
(0.0004) 
DID Estimator (SIZE/BM-Matched) 0.0005 
(0.0004) 
0.0006 
(0.0004) 
DID Estimator (SIZE/BM/RET-Matched) 0.0006 
(0.0005) 
0.0007 
(0.0005) 
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Panel B: Regression Analysis 
 Mean FERROR Median FERROR 
MERGEi 0.0007 0.0009 
 (0.0010) (0.0010) 
AFFECTEDi 0.0013 0.0018 
 (0.0013) (0.0012) 
MERGEi*AFFECTEDi 0.0023** 0.0021* 
 (0.0011) (0.0011) 
LNSIZEi,t-1 -0.0012** -0.0012** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) 
SIGMAi,t-1 -0.0022 -0.0032 
 (0.0038) (0.0039) 
RETANNi,t-1 -0.0137 -0.0051 
 (0.0091) (0.0096) 
LNBMi,t-1 0.0072*** 0.0070*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) 
COVERAGEi,t-1 -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
VOLROEi,t-1 0.0097*** 0.0095*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0011) 
PROFITi,t-1 -0.0179** -0.0181** 
 (0.0081) (0.0082) 
SP500i,t-1 -0.0056*** -0.0051*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0017) 
Merger Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 57,100 57,100 
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Appendix B: Mergers included in the sample (sorted by date) 
Merger 
Number 
Merger 
date Target 
Target's 
industry 
IBES 
No. 
Industry 
code Bidder 
IBES 
No. 
Bidder's 
industry Industry 
1 
9/10/1984 Becker Paribas Brokerage firm 299 6211 
Merrill Lynch & Co 
Inc 183 
Pvd invest, fin 
advisory svcs 6211 
8 
10/31/1988 
Butcher & Co 
Inc 
Securities 
dealer; RE 
broker 44 6211 
Wheat First 
Securities Inc(WF) 282 
Investment 
bank,brokerage 
firm 6211 
2 
12/31/1994 
Kidder 
Peabody & Co 
Investment 
bank 150 6211 
PaineWebber 
Group Inc 189 
Investment 
bank 6211 
3 
5/31/1997 
Dean Witter 
Discover & Co 
Pvd sec 
brokerage svcs 232 6211 
Morgan Stanley 
Group Inc 192 
Investment 
bank 6211 
4 
11/28/1997 
Salomon 
Brothers 
Investment 
bank 242 6211 Smith Barney 254 
Investment 
bank 6211 
9 
1/9/1998 
Principal 
Financial 
Securities 
Investment 
bk;securities 
firm 495 6211 
EVEREN Capital 
Corp 829 
Securities 
brokerage firm 6211 
10 
2/17/1998 
Jensen 
Securities Co 
Securities 
brokerage firm 932 6211 
DA Davidson & 
Co 79 
Investment 
company 6799 
11 
4/6/1998 
Wessels Arnold 
& Henderson 
LLC 
Investment 
bank 280 6211 
Dain Rauscher 
Corp 76 
Investment 
bank 6211 
12 
10/1/1999 
EVEREN 
Capital Corp 
Securities 
brokerage firm 829 6211 
First Union 
Corp,Charlotte,NC 282 
Commercial 
bank; holding 
co 6021 
13 
6/12/2000 
JC Bradford & 
Co 
Securities 
brokerage firm 34 6211 
PaineWebber 
Group Inc 189 
Investment 
bank 6211 
5 
10/15/2000 
Donaldson 
Lufkin & 
Jenrette 
Investment 
bank 86 6211 CSFB 100 
Investment 
bank 6211 
6 
12/10/2000 Paine Webber 
Investment 
bank 189 6211 
UBS Warburg 
Dillon Read 85 
Investment 
bank 6211 
7 
12/31/2000 JP Morgan 
Investment 
bank 873 6211 Chase Manhattan 125 
Investment 
bank 6211 
14 
9/18/2001 
Josephthal 
Lyon & Ross 
Security 
brokers and 
dealers 933 6211 Fahnestock & Co 98 
Securities 
brokerage firm 6211 
15 
3/22/2005 
Parker/Hunter 
Inc 
Pvd 
invest,invest 
bkg svcs 860 6211 
Janney 
Montgomery Scott 
LLC 142 
Pvd sec brkg 
svcs 6211 
 
 
 
 
